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INTRODUCTION

This article considers whether the law can or should protect
speech on private college and university campuses. The easy answer
is “yes.” After all, both public and private institutions are places of
learning and inquiry. Therefore, at first, it might make sense for First
Amendment-type protections to apply across the board—if not
under the United States Constitution, then under state constitutions,
†
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common law, or statutes. Furthermore, the students who helped the
Free Speech Movement spread nationwide in the 1960s and 1970s
did not concern themselves much with legal distinctions between
public and private,1 so why should the law?
Using the law to protect speech on private college and university
campuses becomes more difficult when considering what it takes to
actually litigate a speech claim against a private school. As this article
explains, there are several practical barriers to doing so, ranging
from the settled status of the state action doctrine2 to the public
policies that courts apply to bar claims that allege “educational
malpractice.”3 In addition, some who advocate for First
Amendment-type protections for private campuses may not have
adequately considered the full scope of private educators. Today,
private educators include not only Harvard, Yale, and their regional
equivalents, but also for-profit online universities, which provide
higher education to a disproportionate number of women and
students of color,4 and sectarian schools, which are constitutionally
permitted to regulate speech to fit their interpretations of religious
doctrine.5 There has been little analysis of how speech law would
apply, or not apply, to these schools. This article aims to provide such
analysis.
Minnesota provides a good analytical backdrop to this issue
because it houses one of the nation’s largest for-profit online
universities,6 and Minnesota has a wide array of private schools with
varying sectarian ties.7 Minnesota is also where R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul arose,8 which prevents state actors—including those at public

1. See infra Part III.A.
2. Id.
3. See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 414–16 (7th Cir. 1992).
4. See infra Part II.C.
5. Kelly Sarabyn, Free Speech at Private Universities, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 145, 145
(2010) (“Private colleges . . . are not state actors, and thus, the First Amendment
does not stop them from enacting self-restrictive policies.”).
6. See Sarah Butrymowicz & Sarah Garland, For-Profit Universities: By the
Numbers, HECHINGER REPORT (June 2, 2011), http://hechingerreport.org/for-profituniversities-by-the-numbers/; Contact Us, CAPELLA UNIVERSITY, http://www.capellae
ducation.com/contact/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2018) (stating Capella
University is located in Minnesota).
7. Minnesota’s Private Colleges, MINNESOTA PRIVATE COLLEGE COUNCIL,
https://www.mnprivatecolleges.org/our-colleges (last visited Mar. 20, 2018)
(describing all of the private colleges in Minnesota).
8. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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universities—from enforcing policies that discriminate against
viewpoints.9 Before jerking a knee toward a conclusion that R.A.V.’s
principles should be extended to regulate private actors at private
schools, it is worth considering the viewpoint of Robert A. Viktora
(R.A.V.) in light of recent events.
In 1990, R.A.V., age seventeen, burned a cross on the lawn of an
African American family in St. Paul’s Dayton’s Bluff neighborhood.10
Twenty-seven years later, college-aged men in Charlottesville,
Virginia delivered a similar viewpoint—this time with burning
torches—on the University of Virginia campus.11 Because the protest
took place on public property, like the City of St. Paul, the University
stood virtually powerless to stop it.12 A private university, whether
nonprofit or not, would have been in a different legal position had
the white supremacists’ rally happened there.13
It is a sizable stretch to say anything good came out of
Charlottesville, but the hateful display did provide opportunity to
consider the question of what role, if any, First Amendment-type
speech law can and should play on private property, such as private
college and university campuses. Today, at least, the answer to that
question might be one that free-speech advocates would rather not
hear.
With Charlottesville on the minds of so many, this article begins
by discussing the current status of campus speech.14 It then recounts
the state and federal cases and statutes that brought campus speech
jurisprudence to its present state.15 Next, it explores barriers that
disallow those cases and statutes from applying to private campus
speech.16 This article concludes with thoughts on how education

9. Id. at 378.
10. EDWARD J. CLEARY, BEYOND THE BURNING CROSS: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
THE LANDMARK R.A.V. CASE 3 (1994).
11. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Brian M. Rosenthal, Man Charged After White
Nationalist Rally in Charlottesville Ends in Deadly Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/12/us/charlottesville-protest-white-nationalist
.html.
12. Jack Stripling, Report Faults U. of Virginia on Response to White-Supremacist
Rally, CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.chronicle.com/articl
e/Report-Faults-U-of-Virginia/241147 (“UVa was predisposed to defend
constitutionally protected free speech, as long as violence did not break out.”).
13. See infra Part III.A.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.

632

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:2

about the use of free speech on private campuses is preferable to
enacting or enforcing laws regulating the same.17
II. WHERE WE ARE: THE STATUS OF CAMPUS SPEECH
A.

Current Law and Current Concerns

Although frequently misunderstood, the current law is that the
First Amendment’s Speech Clause (coupled with the Fourteenth
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983) restricts only the actions of state
actors at public colleges and universities.18 Federal law does not
restrain administrators at private universities from infringing on
speech any more than it restrains a private employer or homeowner
from doing so.19
There have been various proposals for filling the First
Amendment gap between public and private institutions of higher
education. The proposals include treating administrators at private
institutions as state actors,20 using state constitutional or common
law to enforce speech-protective provisions in student codes,21 and
enacting statutes to legislatively impose First Amendment principles
on private campuses.22 These ideas are intertwined with the real
stories of the students who helped the Free Speech Movement
spread to campuses nationwide. Some of that story is told in Part III
of this article, which describes the current state of speech on college
and university campuses.23
The current state of free speech on college and university
campuses is not particularly good, and what happened at the
University of Virginia in August 2017 helps explain why. It is hard to
forget the pictures—those of the steel-jawed men and women who
felt empowered to march with torches and chant hideous slogans

17. See infra Part V.
18. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS xi (Yale
Univ. Press 2017).
19. See Erwin Chemerinsky, More Speech Is Better, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1639
(1998).
20. See, e.g., Powe v. Mills, 407 F.2d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1968).
21. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
22. See, e.g., Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991, H.R. 1380, 102d Cong.
(1991).
23. See infra Part III.
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such as “Jews will not replace us.”24 For some, it was the latest
confirmation of deep-seated hate.25 For almost everyone else, it was
a wake-up call. When describing the torch-bearers, a writer in GQ
Magazine practically described the stereotype of his audience: “the
innocuous polo shirts; the trendy haircuts; the wireframe glasses.”26
The march should not have been a surprise. Richard Spencer,
the head of the white nationalist National Policy Institute, targeted
colleges and universities the previous November.27 Charlottesville
“only punctuated a dramatic spike in white supremacist activity on
American campuses that has forced a reckoning among competing
values: safety, free speech and a commitment to tolerance and
diversity.”28 There were fears it would spread; as the 2017–2018
academic year began, administrators at public institutions faced the
reality that they had “few legal options in preventing offensive
lectures from taking place, especially if a student group is affiliated
with the event.”29 A new generation was learning about the power of
the First Amendment, but they were also learning about its limits. As
a writer in Teen Vogue explained, the hands of administrators at
public universities “are largely tied, legally speaking, when it comes
to First Amendment rights” because “they’re legally required to allow
for the contentious discourse at the very least.”30

24. Hawes Spencer & Sheryl Gay Stolbergaug, White Nationalists March on
University
of
Virginia,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
11,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/us/white-nationalists-rally- charlottesvillevirginia.html.
25. See Chris Gayomali, Charlottesville and the Face of White Supremacy, GQ MAG.
(Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.gq.com/story/face-of-white-supremacy (describing
white supremacy as an “enmeshed power” existing since America’s history of
slavery).
26. Id. (describing how the regular attire and indiscreet disposition of the
University of Virginia white supremacists indicates that white supremacists can be
anywhere and blend in with the rest of society).
27. Scott Jaschik, White Power Leader’s New Target: Colleges, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC.
(Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/11/28/whitepower-leaders-next-target-college-campuses.
28. Emily Baumgaertner, After Charlottesville, Colleges Vow to Do Something. But
What?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/us/polit
ics/colleges-racism-charlottesville.html.
29. Dana Goldstein, After Charlottesville Violence, Colleges Brace for More Clashes,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/us/after-charl
ottesville-violence-colleges-brace-for-more-clashes.html.
30. Rachel Jacoby Zoldan, The Charlottesville Tragedy and White Supremacy: How
Colleges and Universities Have Responded, TEEN VOGUE (Aug. 15, 2017, 4:41 PM),
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The same rules do not apply at private colleges and universities,
a distinction that a few websites targeting students, such as the
Student Press Law Center’s website, have tried to explain.31 But by
and large, public institutions have dominated the conversation
about free speech on campus.32 When private campuses are
considered, they typically are seen through a public-school lens.33
Two books, both titled Free Speech on Campus and published as
the 2017–2018 school year began, reflect and reinforce the
narrative.34 The first book, by Sigal R. Ben-Porath of the University
of Pennsylvania’s Graduate School of Education, examined campus
speech from an educator’s perspective.35 The second book,
published eight weeks later, was co-authored by law professors Erwin
Chemerinsky and Howard Gillman.36 The authors of the second
book disclosed in the preface they would not treat private schools
differently, even though the law does.37
Consistent with the idea the law “should” be the same, students
on private and public campuses have voiced viewpoints on topics

http://www.teenvogue.com/story/university-presidents-respond-charlottesvilleracism.
31. Kaitlin DeWulf, A Promise Unkept, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Dec. 16, 2016, 2:14
PM), http://www.splc.org/article/2016/12/a-promise-unkept.
32. See, e.g., Free Speech and Public Schools, CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC. (Apr. 5, 2006),
http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-Menu/Public-education/The-law
-and-its-influence-on-public-school-districts-An-overview/Free-speech-and-public-sc
hools.html (discussing freedom of speech issues at public schools at length, then
tritely noting that “[p]rivate and parochial schools, however, are not similarly
restricted by ideas of individual rights, free speech, and other liberties”).
33. Cory A. DeCresenza, Note, Rethinking the Effect of Public Funding on the
State-Actor Status of Private Schools in First Amendment Freedom of Speech Actions, 59
SYRACUSE L. REV. 471, 473 (2009) (“[S]ome authors have even written that
differences between post-secondary public and private schools are fading in the eyes
of the public at large.”); Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First
Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1537, 1540–41 (1998) (discussing the confusion in First Amendment rights in
terms of private and public organizations).
34. See SIGAL R. BEN-PORATH, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS (Univ. of Penn. Press
2017); CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18.
35. See BEN-PORATH, supra note 34.
36. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18.
37. Id. at xi (“Throughout this book, we rely on First Amendment law in
describing what public universities can and can’t do. But we draw no distinction
between public and private schools when arguing for what they should and shouldn’t
do.”).
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such as race, gender, GLBT rights, and sexual assault.38 Many efforts
in recent years have been positive, peaceful, and influential. For
example, private liberal-arts schools in the Twin Cities have banded
together to organize “Take Back the Night” rallies to advocate on
issues surrounding rape and other sexual violence.39 The Minnesota
Public Interest Research Group operates on private campuses and
advocates for many causes as well.40
Unfortunately, the disruptive and destructive efforts receive
more attention than those carried out peacefully. For example, in
May 2017, the Washington Post wrote about how students disrupted a
forum at St. Olaf College in Northfield, Minnesota, that had been
called to discuss a racist note found on a student’s windshield.41
Earlier that academic year, the Star Tribune reported that University
of Minnesota students received a “lesson in freedom of speech” when
a Minnesota College Republicans’ mural was defaced with the words
“Build the Wall” and when a month later, the Muslim Students
Association’s mural was defaced with “ISIS.”42 The previous
November, when controversial law professor Moshe Halbertal was
shouted down during a speech at the university’s law school, a
protester who was removed from the event learned the limits of the
First Amendment, saying: “I was just chanting, you know. And, you
know, in America, we have freedom of speech, and you know, you’d

38. See, e.g., Free Speech at American Universities Is Under Threat, ECONOMIST (Oct.
12,
2017),
https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21730156-fearspandemic-snowflakery-are-overwrought-free-speech-american-universities
(discussing various opinions on private and public university campuses).
39. Take Back the Night a Success!, MINN. WOMEN’S CONSORTIUM (Oct. 30, 2012),
http://www.mnwomen.org/take-bac.
40. MINNESOTA PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, http://mpirg.org (last
visited March 20, 2018).
41. Peter Holley & Lindsey Bever, A Racist Note Sparked Protests at a Minnesota
College. The School Now Says the Message Was Fake., WASH. POST (May 10, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/05/10/a-racist-no
te-sparked-protests-at-a-minnesota-college-the-school-now-says-the-message-was-fake
The note ended up being a hoax. Id.
42. Liz Sawyer, Graffiti Defaces University of Minnesota’s Muslim Student Association
Sign, STAR TRIB. (Nov. 3, 2016, 4:19 PM), http://www.startribune.com/graffitidefaces-u-s-muslim-student-association-sign/399897391; Liz Sawyer, Vandalism of
Pro-Trump Mural Offers Free-Speech Lesson at University of Minnesota, STAR TRIB. (Oct. 4,
2016, 6:26 PM), http://www.startribune.com/vandalism-of-pro-trump-mural-offersfree-speech-lesson-at-university-of-minnesota/395902471.
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think that chanting would be allowed under, you know, the
constitution, but apparently not.”43
“Definitely not” is the appropriate response. Shout-downs are
not protected speech, and vandalizing bridge murals is not free
speech either.44 Unfortunately, the incidents in Minnesota were
anything but isolated. During the 2016–2017 school year, disrupters
heckled speakers at large public universities in Wisconsin,
California, and Michigan and private universities, including
Georgetown, Columbia, and Northwestern.45 Speakers on racial
issues were shouted down at Middlebury College in Vermont and
Claremont McKenna College near Los Angeles.46 The Middlebury
incident, which stemmed from a speech by author Charles Murray,47
epitomized the state of speech on private campuses. “Conservatives
said that the students were intolerant, had engaged in mob mentality
and were quashing free speech, while those on the left maintained
that the speaker was racist and hateful and had no place on their
campus.”48 Hundreds of alumni signed a letter protesting Murray’s
presence, while the college’s president apologized to Murray and
accused the disruptive students of violating college policy.49
Such incidents prompted Stanley Kurtz, a conservative
commentator, to proclaim 2016–2017 the “Year of the

43. Michael McIntee, Israeli Ethicist Protested at University of Minnesota at 2:55–
3:05, YOUTUBE (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qav_7eXn5_Y;
Maura Lerner, Protesters Disrupt Israeli Professor’s Lecture at University of Minnesota, STAR
TRIB. (Nov. 4, 2015, 11:15 PM), http://www.startribune.com/protesters-disruptisraeli-professor-s-lecture-at-university-of-minnesota/340437581.
44. See Sawyer, Vandalism of Pro-Trump Mural Offers Free-Speech Lesson at University
of Minnesota, supra note 42.
45. Stanley Kurtz, Year of the Shout-Down: It Was Worse Than You Think, NAT’L
REV. (May 31, 2017, 9:48 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/448132/ye
ar-shout-down-worse-you-think-campus-free-speech (detailing different shout-down
events at universities across the country and the possible ramifications of these
shout-downs).
46. Howard Blume, Protesters Disrupt Talk by Pro-Police Author, Sparking Free-Speech
Debate at Claremont McKenna College, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017, 10:20 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-macdonald-claremont-speech-disru
upted-20170408-story.html; Katharine Q. Seelye, Protesters Disrupt Speech by “Bell
Curve” Author at Vermont College, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/03/03/us/middlebury-college-charles-murray-bell-curve-protest.html.
47. Seelye, supra note 46.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Shout-Down.”50 Writing in The National Review, Kurtz described
“increasing violence by a campus Left that has learned
administrators will do nothing to stop it” and criticized
administrators for “locking out conservatives and other controversial
conservative speakers.”51 Receiving less attention was the backlash
against speakers such as Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, an assistant
professor of African American studies at Princeton University, who
“received emails that promised [she] would be lynched, shot and
raped” after Fox News aired a thirty-second segment of her
criticizing Donald Trump.52 As she wrote in The New York Times,
“[w]hat is shocking is that while the right-wing media is wringing
its hands about suppressive leftists, openly racist and
fascist-sympathizing organizations are recruiting young white people
on campuses.”53
B.

Special Rules for Sectarian Schools

Speech advocates across the political spectrum have looked to
the law to protect speech on private campuses,54 but recently,
conservatives such as Kurtz have taken the lead. He co-authored
model legislation that served as a template for the Wisconsin
Campus Free Speech Act, introduced in the spring of 2017 to
mandate punishment for students who prevent speech from
occurring at the state’s public universities.55 At this writing, at least
nine other states have enacted or considered similar legislation.56
50. Kurtz, supra note 45.
51. Id.
52. Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, The “Free Speech” Hypocrisy of Right-Wing Media,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/opinion/thefree-speech-hypocrisy-of-right-wing-media.html.
53. Id.
54. Cliff Maloney, Jr., Colleges Have No Right to Limit Students’ Free Speech, TIME
(Oct. 13, 2016), http://time.com/4530197/college-free-speech-zone/ (detailing
the national Fight for Free Speech campaign to reform unconstitutional speech
codes and abolish free speech zones on college campuses).
55. A.B. 299, 2017 Assemb., 103d Sess. (Wis. 2017); Stanley Kurtz, Jesse Kremer’s
Wisconsin Campus Free Speech Act, NAT’L REV. (May 2, 2017, 10:02 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/447260/jesse-kremers-wisconsin-campusfree-speech-act-goldwater-proposal.
56. Lauren Camera, Campus Free Speech Laws Ignite the Country, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (July 31, 2017, 5:40 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/articles/2017-07-31/campus-free-speech-laws-ignite-the-country (noting that
North Carolina, Colorado, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia have such legislation and
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A California legislator took the model legislation a step further
by proposing the California Campus Free Speech Act, which would
condition “some (but not all) state aid to private colleges and
universities on compliance with the Act ([with] an exemption for
private religious colleges).”57 The exemption reflects that under the
First Amendment, schools with strong religious ties “can exercise
religious freedom on an institutional basis, in the form of
self-governance as well as in the ability to obtain exemptions from
laws they and their members would otherwise have to obey.”58 Those
laws would include the laws of free speech and free association.59
For several years, speech about GLBT issues has been a
particular target at some, but certainly not all, private colleges and
universities. A 2011 story in the New York Times chronicled the
suspension of a student at North Central University in Minneapolis
for distributing flyers that provided information about a gay-support
site, efforts by Harding University in Arkansas to block access to an
online magazine “featuring personal accounts of the travails of gay
students,” and Baylor University’s refusal to recognize a club
opposed to homophobia.60 As a Baylor spokesperson told the Times,
“Baylor expects students not to participate in advocacy groups
promoting an understanding of sexuality that is contrary to biblical
teaching.”61
More recently, a 2016 article in The Nation magazine titled The
Schools Where Free Speech Goes to Die singled out Baylor University, the
University of Dayton, and Notre Dame University for not recognizing
“atheist or humanist student organizations”; Liberty University for
not recognizing the student Democratic club; and the University of
St. Thomas in St. Paul for asking a visiting speaker to sign an
agreement to not present or perform “material that is derogatory of
the Catholic Church.”62
California, Illinois, Michigan, Texas, and Wisconsin are considering similar
legislative proposals).
57. Stanley Kurtz, Melissa Melendez’s California Campus Free Speech Act, NAT’L REV.
(May 2, 2017, 1:16 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/447268/melissamelendezs-california-campus-free-speech-act-goldwater-proposal.
58. Elizabeth J. Hubertz, Loving the Sinner: Evangelical Colleges and their LGB
Students, 35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 147, 160 (2017); see also infra Part III.C.
59. Id.
60. Erik Eckholm, Even on Religious Campuses, Students Fight for Gay Identity, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/us/19gays.html.
61. Id.
62. Katha Pollitt, The Schools Where Free Speech Goes to Die, NATION (Jan. 21, 2016),
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But the core concern has remained GLBT issues—specifically
Title IX, the federal law banning discrimination “on the basis of sex”
at colleges and universities that receive federal financial assistance.63
Some schools fear “their sexual conduct codes might be threatened
if Title IX’s anti-discrimination provisions were read to include
sexual orientation as well as sex and gender identity.”64 “Prior to the
Human Rights Campaign’s release of a report in December 2015,
relatively few knew that religious exemptions to Title IX even
existed.”65 The United States Department of Education is “highly
deferential to the educational institutions claiming religious
exemptions,” and the merits have not been litigated.66 “Virtually no
scholarship exists on the subject, even within the abundant and
well-developed recent theoretical work on broader questions of
religious exemption.”67
Concerns about the exemptions caused forty Democratic U.S.
Senators, led by Democrat Al Franken of Minnesota, to urge the U.S.
Department of Education to be more transparent.68 The
Department did so on a website that, as of this writing, contained a
“Religious Exemptions Index” with approximately 120 requests
between 2009 and 2016.69 It was impossible to discern how many
exemptions the Department has granted because the website
provided data only through December 2016 and was identified as
“Archived Information,” not updated since February 2017.70
The advocacy group Campus Pride captured some of the data
and incorporated it into a database that, as of September 2017,
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-schools-where-free-speech-goes-to-die/.
63. Id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
64. Hubertz, supra note 58, at 149.
65. Kif Augustine-Adams, Religious Exemptions to Title IX, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 327,
327 (2016).
66. Id. at 327–28.
67. Id.
68. Letter from Senator Al Franken et al. to John King, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Education (May 2, 2016), https://www.franken.senate.gov/
files/documents/160502SenateTitleIXLetter.pdf.
69. Archived Religious Exemptions Index—2009-2016, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/z-index-linkslist-2009-2016.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
70. Id. After a congressman called for the data to be removed from the
internet, its continued availability became uncertain. See Letter from Senator James
Lankford, Republican of Oklahoma, to Donald Trump, U.S. President (Apr. 13,
2017), https://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/4.13.17%20Religious%
20Freedom%20Letter%20to%20POTUS.pdf.
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included documentation from several dozen schools that received
exemptions.71 According to the website, Minnesota-based Crown
College and University of Northwestern requested and received Title
IX exemptions.72 In their letters to the Department of Education,
Crown College requested “freedom to respond to transgender
individuals in accordance with its theologically-grounded
convictions.”73 Similarly, the University of Northwestern stated the
school does not “affirm or support transgender identity or
expression” and that “any individual who violates campus standards
for biblical living is subject to discipline, including expulsion.”74
Some school codes restrain speech more explicitly, including
when it occurs off-campus—particularly on GLBT issues. In her
recent article, Loving the Sinner: Evangelical Colleges and Their LGB
Students, Elizabeth J. Hubertz singled out provisions at sectarian
schools that prohibit “defending or advocating a homosexual
lifestyle,” “posting statements on social media promoting and
celebrating homosexuality, adultery, and fornication etc.,” and
participating in groups “that promote understandings of sexuality
that are contrary to these biblical teachings.”75 Potentially, “a
heterosexual student could be guilty of a conduct violation if he or
she joined Campus Pride.”76 Although many such provisions would
be unconstitutional if enacted at public universities, Hubertz
observed that “[p]rivate religious colleges are for the most part free
to place whatever restrictions on student speech they deem
appropriate to their mission.”77
Just because restrictions on speech are unconstitutional for
public universities does not mean such universities have not tried to
regulate speech. Since 2005, the Foundation for Individual Rights in
71. Shame List: The Absolute Worst Campuses for LGBTQ Youth, CAMPUS PRIDE,
https://www.campuspride.org/shamelist (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
72. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 69.
73. Letter from D. Joel Wiggins, President, Crown College, to Catherine
Lhamon, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights
(May 25, 2016), https://www.campuspride.org/wp-content/uploads/crowncollege-request-05252016.pdf.
74. Letter from Alan S. Cureton, President, University of Northwestern, St.
Paul, to Catherine Lhamon, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Education,
Office for Civil Rights (Feb. 12, 2016), https://campuspride.org/wpcontent/uploads/university-of-northwestern-st-paul-request-02122016.pdf.
75. Hubertz, supra note 58, at 188.
76. Id. at 189.
77. Id.
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Education, or “FIRE,” has featured “speech codes of the month” at
both public and private institutions with limited or no sectarian
ties.78 Codes at Southwest Minnesota State University, St. Olaf
College, and Macalester College are among those that have been
featured.79 FIRE defines a speech code as a policy “that prohibits
expression that would be protected by the First Amendment in
society at large.”80 Examples include bans on “offensive language” or
“disparaging remarks” and policies that try to restrict protests and
demonstrations to “free speech zones.”81
Some codes restrict speech while including seemingly
contradictory provisions promising that the school will protect
speech.82 Student-advocacy groups such as FIRE and the Student
Press Law Center view this discrepancy as warranting the use of
contract law to hold private schools to the burdens of their
bargains.83 But advocates for individual rights pay little attention to
individuals at strongly sectarian schools; the common conception is
that every student chooses a school and the restrictions that come
with it.84 However, as Hubertz has demonstrated, some students who
desire to speak out face the reality that their parents will only pay
tuition at schools where speech is regulated in accordance with the
institutions’ interpretations of religious doctrine.85

78. Samantha Harris, Speech Code of the Month, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN
EDUC.,
https://www.thefire.org/category/newsdesk/speech-code-of-the-month
(last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
79. Id.
80. What Are Speech Codes?, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC.,
https://www.thefire.org/spotlight/what-are-speech-codes (last visited Mar. 20,
2018).
81. Id.
82. Kaitlin DeWulf, In Spite of Lip-Service Free Speech Codes, First Amendment Rights
Are Tenuous at Private Universities, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Dec. 16, 2016, 2:14 PM),
http://www.splc.org/article/2016/12/a-promise-unkept;
Private
Universities,
FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS. IN EDUC., https://www.thefire.org/spotlight/publicand-private-universities (last visited Mar. 20, 2018) [hereinafter Private Universities].
83. See DeWulf, supra note 82; Private Universities, supra note 82.
84. Eric Posner, Universities Are Right—and Within Their Rights—to Crack Down
on Speech and Behavior, SLATE (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/02/university_speech_codes_students_are
_children_who_must_be_protected.html (“As long as universities are free to choose
whatever rules they want, students with different views can sort themselves into
universities with different rules.”).
85. Hubertz, supra note 58, at 173–75.
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Profiting from an Online Revolution

Advocates for extending speech law to private campuses have
also overlooked the role that for-profit online educators play,
particularly in providing higher education to women and students of
color.86 Two of the largest such schools, Capella University and
Walden University, are Minnesota-based and reflect this trend. As of
December 31, 2016, Capella’s student body was 77% female and 51%
students of color.87 Walden’s demographic data was comparable.88
Walden awarded 682 doctorates to African American students
between 2011 and 2015, “nearly twice the number awarded by
second-place Howard University, a historically black university in
Washington, D.C. Every other university lags far behind.”89
Walden and Capella were among thirty for-profit online
educators that Congress scrutinized in 2010–2012, schools a Senate
committee report acknowledged as having “an important role to play
in higher education” and creating “a ‘new American majority’ of
non-traditional students.”90 Between 2001 and 2010, Capella’s
enrollment grew more than tenfold from 3,759 students to 38,634.91
Walden’s growth rate more than doubled that of even Capella,
growing from 2,082 students in fall 2001 to 47,456 students in 2010.92
By 2015, the combined enrollment of Capella and Walden outpaced
all of Minnesota’s other private colleges, universities, career schools,

86. GUILBERT C. HENTSCHKE, VICENTE M. LECHUGA & WILLIAM G. TIERNEY, FORPROFIT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: THEIR MARKETS, REGULATION, PERFORMANCE, AND
PLACE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 11–12 (Guilbert C. Hentschke et al. eds., 2010)
(explaining that for-profit colleges and universities have provided “the labor market
with a relatively high share of people of color”).
87. Capella University Fact Sheet, CAPELLA UNIV. (July 26, 2017),
https://www.capella.edu/content/dam/capella/PDF/FactSheet.pdf.
88. Walden Total Student Population and Demographics, Including Undergraduate
and Graduate, WALDEN UNIV. (2015), https://www.waldenu.edu/-/media/
Walden/files/about-walden/data/students/total-student-population-and-demogra
phics-v-2.pdf.
89. Jeffrey Mervis, Online University Leads United States in Awarding Doctorates to
Blacks, SCIENCE (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/02/
online-university-leads-united-states-awarding-doctorates-blacks.
90. HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS COMM., U.S. SENATE, FOR PROFIT HIGHER
EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE
STUDENT SUCCESS (2012).
91. Id. at pt. II.
92. Id.
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and graduate and professional schools in growth by more than 2,000
students.93
The growth of for-profit online education comes at a sensitive
time for both brick-and-mortar institutions and the future of free
speech on college and university campuses. Tolerance for unpopular
expression was lessening even before Charlottesville. The Higher
Education Research Institute found that more than 70% of the
incoming freshmen in the fall of 2015 agreed their schools “should
prohibit racist/sexist speech on campus,” and around 43% agreed
that colleges and universities had the “right to ban extreme speakers
from campus.”94 A Gallup poll in March 2016 found that 69% of
students believed colleges and universities should restrict “slurs and
other language on campus that is intentionally offensive to certain
groups.”95 Similarly, 63% of students favored policies that ban
students from wearing costumes “that stereotype certain racial or
ethnic groups,” and 28% believed students should be permitted to
ban reporters from protests.96 The survey noted no discernable
differences between public and private institutions.97 Indeed, none
of the polls noted discernable differences between public and
private institutions, which is not overly surprising given that the
students who built the Free Speech Movement did not distinguish
much between public and private campuses either.98
III. HOW WE GOT THERE: THE PERILOUS PATH FROM CHICKASAW TO
ST. PAUL TO CHARLOTTESVILLE
A.

The Evolution of the State Action Doctrine

A workable starting point for examining the Free Speech
Movement’s spread to private campuses could be University of

93. OFFICE OF HIGHER EDUC., ENROLLMENT AT A GLANCE (2016).
94. Kevin Eagan et al., The American Freshman: National Norms Fall 2015, COOP.
INST. RESEARCH PROGRAM 47 (2016), www.heri.ucla.edu/monographs/TheAm
erican Freshman2015.pdf.
95. Free Expression on Campus: A Survey of U.S. College Students and U.S. Adults,
GALLUP 13 (2016), http://www.knightfoundation.org/media/uploads/publication
pdfs/FreeSpeech_campus.pdf.
96. Id. at 13–14.
97. See generally id. (noting the statistical differences between public and private
institutions).
98. Id. (“Students at private (80%) and public institutions (77%) differ little in
their preference for an open college environment.”).
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California-Berkeley, the public campus where the movement began
in 1964.99 But to adequately consider how sectarian schools and
for-profit online educators fit into the mix, a better starting point is
the private company town of Chickasaw, Alabama, where Grace
Marsh was arrested on Christmas Eve in 1943 for distributing
literature consistent with her Jehovah’s Witness faith.100
Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned Chickasaw and had a
town code that banned solicitation without a permit.101 Ms. Marsh
was convicted of trespassing.102 In 1946, her case reached the United
States Supreme Court, which held that her individual right to
distribute literature enjoyed a “preferred position” under the First
Amendment.103 To the Supreme Court, Chickasaw’s private
ownership was immaterial because Chickasaw served a “public
function” and had “all the characteristics of any other American
town.”104
Marsh v. Alabama helped frame questions that would arise on
private campuses in the decades to come. For example, when might
an individual’s right to speak freely assume a preferred position that
supersedes that of the private institution?105 Are campus codes legal
when they implicate speech?106 Do private colleges and universities
serve a “public function”?107 When might their administrators be
considered state actors?108
A form of the last question arose during the Civil Rights Era in
the context of whether private institutions could choose students
based on race. Some courts said yes, and others said no.109 In 1964,
99. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 74–78.
100. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Marsh v. State, 21 So. 2d 558, 560
(Ala. Ct. App. 1945).
101. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503.
102. Id. at 516.
103. Id. at 509.
104. Id. at 502–03, 506–07.
105. See id. at 509.
106. See Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Critical Race Coalitions: Key Movements that
Performed the Theory, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2000) (describing a campus
speech code that sparked student protests at Berkeley).
107. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (holding that a private school
educating maladjusted high school students serves a public function, but not one
that was an “exclusive prerogative of the State”).
108. Powe v. Mills, 407 F.2d 73, 82–83 (2d Cir. 1968).
109. Compare Guillory v. Admins. of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674, 687 (E.D.
La. 1962) (finding a private university is not a state actor), with Hammond v. Univ.
of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951, 951 (5th Cir. 1965) (finding a private university is a state
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student concerns about race and race-based discrimination issues
coalesced with concerns over military activities in Vietnam to
famously start the Free Speech Movement at the University of
California-Berkeley campus.110
The catalyst for the movement was a campus code that regulated
speech and curtailed recruitment by political organizations, a
restriction that prompted students to protest in favor of the right to
protest.111 Their nonviolent occupation of Sproul Hall at Berkeley
resulted in the “largest mass arrest in California history” and “forever
altered activism at U.S. colleges.”112 It also drew the attention of
Ronald Reagan, then a candidate for California governor, who
vowed to “clean up the mess at Berkeley.”113 Reagan was elected,
“empowering a national conservative movement”114 that embraced
the sorts of campus codes that FIRE, Stanley Kurtz, other
conservatives, and some civil libertarians oppose today.115
The Free Speech Movement was not limited to public campuses
like Berkeley. At Harvard University in 1966, protesters shouted

actor).
110. See Richard Gonzales, Berkeley’s Fight for Free Speech Fired up Student Protest
Movement, NPR (Oct. 5, 2014, 7:57 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/10/05/353849
567/when-political-speech-was-banned-at-berkeley; see also Richard Delgado, Liberal
McCarthyism and the Origins of Critical Race Theory, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1505, 1525 (2009)
(explaining how “unrest broke out at Berkeley and other U.C. campuses over free
speech, civil rights, and the Vietnam War”); Kenneth Lasson, Controversial Speakers
on Campus: Liberties, Limitations, and Common-Sense Guidelines, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
39, 43 (1999) (“The modern campus free-speech movement was born in 1964 at the
University of California (Berkeley).”).
111. See Cho & Westley, supra note 106, at 1381.
112. John Woodrow Cox, Berkeley Gave Birth to the Free Speech Movement in the
1960s. Now, Conservatives Are Demanding It Include Them., WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/04/20/berkeley-ga
ve-birth-to-the-free-speech-movement-in-the-1960s-now-conservatives-are-demandin
g-it-include-them; David Margolick, After 30 Years, Return to Berkeley, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
5,
1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/05/us/after-30-years-return-toberkeley.html.
113. Larry Gordon, Graying Activists Return to Berkeley to Mark ‘64 Free Speech
Protests, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/education/lame-berkeley-free-speech-20140928-story.html; CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note
18, at 76.
114. Gordon, supra note 113.
115. Id. (“[A] video of Reagan’s 1966 campaign speech [shows him] advocating
that protesters should be ‘taken by the scruff of the neck and thrown out of the
university once and for all.’”).
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down Defense Secretary Robert McNamara.116 At Columbia
University in 1968, students occupied Hamilton Hall to protest the
university’s involvement with weapons research and the school’s
plans for a gymnasium with potentially segregated entrances.117 In
1970, students gathered at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota,
to develop a “People’s Peace Treaty” that called for an end to the
Vietnam War.118 The activism came at a confusing legal time. Marsh
v. Alabama was good law, and in 1968 the Supreme Court extended
its scope by holding in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. that union members had a right to picket
their employer in a privately-owned shopping mall.119
Six months after Amalgamated Food, the Second Circuit
considered whether a private university’s administrators were state
actors when they punished students for speaking out against the war
and racism in Powe v. Mills.120 The case arose when students at Alfred
University, a private school in western New York, were disciplined for
disrupting an R.O.T.C. ceremony on the university’s football field
during Parents Day.121 Seven students were sanctioned under the
university’s “Policy on Demonstrations.”122 The policy proclaimed
that “[t]he University cherishes the right of individual students or
student groups to dissent and to demonstrate,” but warned that
“responsible dissent carries with it a sensitivity for the civil rights of
others, and a recognition that other students have a right to dissent
from the dissenters.”123

116. See Fox Butterfield, 29 Years Later, McNamara Is Given a Warmer Welcome, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 27, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/27/us/29-years-latermcnamara-is-given-warmer-welcome.html.
117. See Robin Shulman, At Columbia, Remembering a Revolution, WASH. POST (Apr.
27, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/04/27/
ST2008042700138.html.
118. Randy Furst, Vietnam War Era Activists Reconvene at Macalester College, STAR
TRIB. (May 4, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/vietnam-war-era-activistsreconvene-at-macalester-college/378033081.
119. 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968) (quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506
(1946)) (“The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by
the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory
and constitutional rights of those who use it.”), abrogated by Hudgens v. N.L.R.B.,
424 U.S. 507 (1976).
120. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
121. See id. at 77–78.
122. Id. at 79.
123. Id. at 85–86.
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The state action issue was complicated because four of the
students were in the Liberal Arts College, which the New York
Legislature “incorporated as a private university in 1857,” and three
were in the Ceramics College, which the state founded in 1900.124
The court easily affirmed the suspensions of the Liberal Arts
students, holding that “Alfred’s football field does not fit the rubric
of either Marsh or Logan Valley Plaza; it was open only to persons
connected with the University or licensed by it to participate in or
attend athletic contests or other events.”125 But the court held the
administrators at the Ceramic College acted under the color of state
law because the state founded that college.126
With the state action question unsettled, Chief Justice Earl
Warren—the architect of the landmark Brown v. Board of Education
opinion that desegregated schools—retired in June 1969, and
Warren Burger began leading the Supreme Court rightward.127
Meanwhile, the opposition to the Vietnam War was growing. On
December 1, 1969, the Selective Service held its first lottery since
1942 to determine who among college-aged men would be drafted
for military service the following year.128 A wave of student activism
followed, prompting another “conservative response” in the form of
student conduct codes to establish “a standard of decency and
respect in the academic community beyond that existing in society
at large.”129
The University of Minnesota adopted its Code of Conduct on
July 10, 1970,130 a fateful date for Minnesota student activism. Late
that evening, the “Minnesota 8,” several of whom had university ties,
entered Minnesota Selective Service offices in Little Falls,
Alexandria, and Winona, to destroy draft records.131 Two were
124. Id. at 75.
125. Id. at 80.
126. Id. at 82–83. The Second Circuit affirmed the students’ discipline because
they failed to provide notice for the protest as the Policy of Demonstrations
required. Id. at 84.
127. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE
OF THE JUDICIAL RIGHT 79–81 (2016).
128. The Vietnam Lotteries, SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, https://www.sss.gov/About
/History-And-Records/lotter1 (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
129. See Eule & Varat, supra note 33, at 1591 n.234.
130. Board of Regents Policy, UNIV. OF MINN. 1, 1 (1970),
https://regents.umn.edu/sites/regents.umn.edu/files/policies/Student_Conduct
_Code.pdf.
131. United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1972); David Hawley,
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convicted.132 On appeal, Eighth Circuit Judge Gerald W. Heaney of
Duluth, a “stalwart liberal” who played a key role in desegregation,133
wrote an opinion affirming the convictions but giving the
conscientious objectors every benefit of the doubt. “As legitimate as
this technique may be,” Judge Heaney explained, “those who use it
must risk the possibility that their tactics will be found inappropriate
or the governmental action valid. The latter is the case here.”134
Disruptive and destructive tactics were not limited to public
universities. On the night National Guardsmen killed four students
at Kent State University in Ohio, a protest that began at St. Louis’s
private Washington University moved to Air Force and Army
R.O.T.C. buildings, where fires were set.135 Again, the protesters were
convicted,136 and again, Judge Heaney wrote the opinion affirming
the convictions,137 but this time he warned that the Eighth Circuit
stood ready “to protect constitutionally guaranteed activities or
conduct from interference by either the State or private
individuals.”138
It was unclear whether those “private individuals” could include
administrators at private colleges and universities. The question
arose again at Washington University when students sued the
chancellor, alleging he “refused to prevent the disruption of classes
and educational activities by a small group of protesting students.”139
In that context, the district court ruled the chancellor was a state
actor because “[e]ducation is a public function.”140 But then in 1972,
the Burger-led Supreme Court held in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner that
there was no First Amendment right to distribute antiwar literature
in a private shopping mall.141

“Peace Crimes” Tells Minnesota 8’s War Story, MINNPOST (Feb. 21, 2008),
https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2008/02/peace-crimes-tells-minnesota
-8s-war-story.
132. Kroncke, 459 F.2d at 698.
133. Dennis Hevesi, Gerald W. Heaney, a Judge Who Ruled for the Desegregation of
Public Schools, Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/06/23/us/23heaney.html.
134. Kroncke, 459 F.2d at 702.
135. United States v. Mechanic, 454 F.2d 849, 850–51, 850 n.1 (8th Cir. 1971).
136. Id. at 851.
137. Id. at 857.
138. Id. at 852.
139. Belk v. Chancellor of Wash. Univ., 336 F. Supp. 45, 46 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
140. Id. at 48.
141. 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972).
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The case did little to quench activism on private campuses. In
1974, protesters shouted down President Richard Nixon’s chairman
of the Model Cities Task Force at the University of Chicago.142 When
William Shockley brought his theory of African American inferiority
to Yale, Harvard, and New York University, he received rude
welcomes.143 “As a result of its Shockley episode, Yale decided to
reexamine its attitude toward freedom of speech.”144 A Yale
committee studied “free expression, peaceful dissent, mutual respect
and tolerance at Yale” and recommended the institution redouble
its efforts to protect free speech by imposing “sanctions against
disrupters.”145
As one of the nation’s most influential private universities
promised to discipline students for disruptive dissent, litigants
argued federal law should apply to private colleges and universities
that benefited from federal funds. The theory did not fare well in
cases involving employment and anti-discrimination claims.146 In
1973, the Second Circuit held administrators at Brooklyn Law
School did not act under color of state law when they expelled two
underperforming students who advocated against the Vietnam War
and for racial equity.147
Still, as the Vietnam War ended, it was unclear whether the First
Amendment’s free speech principles would apply on private
campuses. As late as 1977, the “nebulous character of state action”
prompted the Minnesota Supreme Court to hold in Abbariao v.
Hamline University School of Law that a law student stated a claim when
142. Robert Cassidy, University Professors Under Attack, CHICAGO TRIB. (Mar. 26,
1974), http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1974/03/26/page/14/article/acade
mic-racism.
143. Anthony Lewis, A Report on the Damages to the Right of Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 26, 1975), http://www.nytimes.com/1975/01/26/archives/a-report-on-thedangers-to-the-right-of-free-speech.html.
144. Id.
145. Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale, YALE U. (Dec. 23, 1974),
http://yalecollege.yale.edu/deans-office/reports/report-committee-freedom-expr
ession-yale; see also CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 156–57.
146. See, e.g., Williams v. Howard Univ., 528 F.2d 658, 660–61 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(rejecting that acceptance of federal funding makes a school’s readmission decision
a government action); Spark v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 510 F.2d 1277, 1279–83 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (discussing a decision to not provide a raise); Blouin v. Loyola Univ., 506
F.2d 20, 20–22 (5th Cir. 1975) (discussing a decision to not renew a contract);
Wahba v. N.Y. Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 97–104 (2d Cir. 1974) (discussing a decision to
dismiss a research assistant).
147. Grafton v. Brooklyn Law Sch., 478 F.2d 1137, 1143 (2d Cir. 1973).

650

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:2

he challenged his expulsion as “arbitrary” or “capricious.”148 In 1982,
the United States Supreme Court all but resolved the question,
holding in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn that administrators at a private
secondary school—99% publicly funded—were not state actors
when retaliating against a teacher for speaking her mind.149 Thus,
the state action doctrine at the federal level became “a bright-line
rule that the private institution always wins and the individual fired
or disciplined by it for expression always loses.”150 There was no
indication the Supreme Court would hold differently when students
at private colleges or universities sought the First Amendment’s
protection, so advocates for extending speech law had to look
outside the United States Constitution.
B.

The Role of State Law in Filling a First Amendment Gap

As the state action issue was litigated, the Vietnam War became
a catalyst in suggesting the use of state law—common law,
constitutional law, or a mixture of them—to protect speech on
private campuses.151 Before the war, university discipline was justified
on the idea that it was “part of the inculcation of institutional values
into the student.”152 Even at public institutions, students “had few or
no cognizable due process rights, and even summary expulsion was,
in most cases, unchallengeable.”153 Then, students pushed back.
From their perspective, permitting universities to discipline students
on an in loco parentis theory was “nothing more than the justification
offered by college administrators when other justifications
fail[ed].”154
A movement toward protecting students’ due process rights
originated in 1971 when the Twenty-Sixth Amendment lowered the
voting age to eighteen, reflecting the view that the draft age should

148. 258 N.W.2d 108, 111–12 (Minn. 1977).
149. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 832, 842–43 (1982).
150. Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 1639.
151. See The Twenty-Sixth Amendment: Resolving the Federal Circuit Split over College
Students’ First Amendment Rights, 14 TEX. J. ON CIV. LIBERTIES & CIV. RTS. 27, 50–52
(2008); Sarabyn, supra note 5.
152. Andrew R. Kloster, Student and Professorial Causes of Action Against NonUniversity Actors, 23 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 143, 147 nn.27–29 (2013).
153. Id. at 147–48.
154. Note, Common Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the State Action
Principle, 84 YALE L.J. 120, 141 (1974).
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match the voting age.155 Eighteen became the age of majority, and
“as colleges became managed more like businesses, courts deemed
the relationship between student and university as contractual in
nature.”156 The law was murky. Although California courts
recognized that a college or university’s written materials can
become part of a contract,157 many other courts held a student
“contracts away his right to due process.”158 Other courts were
developing a due process cause of action based on the theory that
students, even at private schools, had property interests in their
educations.159 Still other courts were creatively melding
constitutional and common law. For example, the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Abbariao v. Hamline University School of Law noted
that “[t]he requirements imposed by the common law on private
universities parallel those imposed by the due process clause on
public universities.”160
Then, state constitutions received a boost. Frustrated by the
Supreme Court’s shift from protecting individual rights, in 1977,
Justice William Brennan published a Harvard Law Review article in
which he urged states to apply the “font of individual liberties” in
state constitutions to protect rights, including speech rights.161
There was and is a textual basis for doing so. Although the First
Amendment (coupled with the Fourteenth Amendment and 42
U.S.C. § 1983) reaches only state actors, the speech clauses in state
constitutions “have a more affirmative cast” and do not explicitly
reference state action.162
The Minnesota Constitution’s free speech clause is typical of
this “affirmative cast.” It states that “[t]he liberty of the press shall
forever remain inviolate, and all persons may freely speak, write and
publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of such right.”163 The California Constitution’s provision is
155. See Kloster, supra note 152, at 147–48.
156. Id.
157. Zumbrun v. Univ. of S. Cal., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1, 10 (1972).
158. See Common Law Rights for Private University Students: Beyond the State Action
Principle, supra note 154, at 143.
159. See id. at 145–50.
160. 258 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Minn. 1977). New York’s highest court was among
the courts to apply Abbariao favorably. See Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404 N.E.2d 1302,
1305 (N.Y. 1980).
161. Brennan, supra note 21, at 491, 502.
162. Eule & Varat, supra note 33, at 1564.
163. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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similar.164 In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, the California
Supreme Court invoked the California Constitution’s provision to
affirm the rights of high school students “to solicit signatures for a
petition to be sent to the White House in Washington.”165 After the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the holding,166 courts in at
least five states applied state constitutions to protect speech rights in
shopping malls, irrespective of state action, while most states,
including Minnesota, did not.167
Private colleges and universities were a different story. Supreme
courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey applied their state
constitutions to protect speech at private schools—at least at political
events open to the public. The Pennsylvania case arose at
Muhlenberg College in Allentown, Pennsylvania, during a speech by
then-FBI Director Clarence Kelley.168 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reversed the nonstudent protesters’ trespassing convictions,
explaining that Muhlenberg “permitted the public to walk its
campus freely,” held the event “in an area of the college normally
open to the public,” and provided a forum for a “controversial public
figure.”169 The New Jersey Supreme Court’s rationale was similar
when it reversed the conviction of a nonstudent who sold political
materials at Princeton University.170 The court focused on the
“central purposes” of Princeton as articulated in the university’s
documentation, which described free inquiry and free expression as
“indispensable” to the university’s central purposes.171
Meanwhile, courts narrowed the parameters of contract law.
Although many courts were affirming the general idea that students
could assert contract claims against schools, by 1992, many courts
were barring claims that alleged “educational malpractice.”172 Courts
cited public policy considerations, including “the lack of a
164. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish
his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A
law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.”).
165. 592 P.2d 341, 342 (Cal. 1979).
166. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 75 (1980).
167. Steven P. Aggergaard, Religion, Speech, and the Minnesota Constitution:
State-Based Protections Amid First Amendment Instabilities, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 719,
731 nn.64–65 (2006) (citing State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1999)).
168. Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1383–84 (Pa. 1981).
169. Id. at 1390–91.
170. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 616, 630–31 (N.J. 1980).
171. Id. at 630–31.
172. Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 414–16 (7th Cir. 1992).
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satisfactory standard of care by which to evaluate an educator,”
difficulties in determining damages, students’ differing attitudes
toward education, a potential “flood of litigation,” and fears that
courts would micromanage higher education.173 To overcome the
bar, a student had to “point to an identifiable contractual promise
that the defendant [college or university] failed to honor.”174
The use of contract law received a boost in 1998 when professor
Charles Kors and litigator Harvey Silvergate published The Shadow
University: The Betrayal of Liberty on America’s Campuses, which took aim
at “verbal behavior” provisions in campus codes.175 The authors
found restrictions at the University of Minnesota so egregious that
“Minnesota really should have its own chapter.”176 Kors and
Silvergate described “lesser known nonconstitutional avenues” for
protecting speech on campuses, including contract law, but
acknowledged “the outcome of litigation against a college may be
uncertain.”177
An “overwhelming response” to the book prompted Kors and
Silvergate to form the Foundation for Individual Rights in
Education, or FIRE.178 Advocates at FIRE have concluded that
contract law “offers the best solution” to protect speech on private
campuses because it “can protect the liberal ideal of universities as
free speech institutions without sacrificing the right of private
association.”179
A year after The Shadow University was published, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals adopted the educational malpractice bar in Alsides
v. Brown Institute Ltd.180 In that case, the court held that a claim
against a school based on failure to provide “specifically promised
educational services” is actionable, but one requiring
“comprehensive review of a myriad of educational and pedagogical
factors, as well as administrative policies” is not.181 Alsides

173.
174.
175.

Id. at 414 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 416–17.
ALAN CHARLES KORS & HARVEY A. SILVERGATE, THE SHADOW UNIVERSITY: THE
BETRAYAL OF LIBERTY ON AMERICA’S CAMPUSES 147 (The Free Press 1998).
176. Id. at 174–78.
177. Id. at 339, 345, 354.
178. Mission, FOUND. FOR INDIV. RTS. IN EDUC., https://www.thefire.org/aboutus/mission (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
179. Sarabyn, supra note 5, at 146.
180. 592 N.W.2d 468, 475 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
181. Id. at 472–73.
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“corresponded with the great weight of authority in this country.”182
By 2013, roughly two-thirds of the states recognized some sort of
common law claim under which students could sue their schools, but
the claims were generally subject to the educational malpractice
bar.183 By 2017, the question of whether contract law could or would
protect speech on private campuses still remained, in the words of
Kors and Silvergate, “uncertain.”184
C.

From Stage Right, Enter the Statutes

In The Shadow University, Kors and Silvergate discussed legislative
efforts to extend First Amendment protections to campuses.185 By
the late 1990s, there had been two such efforts—one federal186 and
one in California.187 Both efforts were sponsored by legislators from
the side of the political aisle that once favored speech-restrictive
codes during the Vietnam War and Civil Rights Era.188 On the other
side of the aisle, progressives were embracing the sorts of codes they
loved to hate a generation earlier.189
To understand the ideological shift, a good starting point is not
a college or university, but instead the Dayton’s Bluff neighborhood
of St. Paul where, on June 21, 1990, Robert A. Viktora (R.A.V.)
pieced together a cross from broken chair legs and burned it on the
front yard of an African American family.190 Prosecutors in juvenile
court chose not to charge Viktora with a conduct-based crime, such
as terroristic threats.191 Their tool was St. Paul’s Bias-Motivated
Crime Ordinance, which made it a misdemeanor to use an object
“which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.”192

182. Elizabeth A. Emerson, Comment, Rejecting Disgruntled Students’ Claims: A
Modern Educational Theory, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 839, 860 (2000).
183. Kloster, supra note 152, at 148–50 & nn. 32, 34–37.
184. KORS & SILVERGATE, supra note 175, at 351–54.
185. Id.
186. Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991, H.R. 1380, 102d Cong. (1991).
187. ANN. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(c) (West 2009).
188. See Eule & Varat, supra note 33, at 1591–92.
189. FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, “SPEECH ACTS” AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1, 26
(1993).
190. CLEARY, supra note 10, at 3–4, 8.
191. Id. at 10.
192. Id.; see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379–81 (1992).
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By its plain language, the ordinance criminalized only certain
categories of speech, and its constitutionality was challenged. As
R.A.V. worked through Minnesota courts,193 passions ran high on
college and university campuses—private campuses included.
Student commentator Evan G.S. Siegel set the scene in a 1990 law
review comment:
The same hostilities and conflicts that contribute to
agitation on the campuses of the nation’s public
universities also tear at the social fabric of private
universities in the United States. On campuses from coast
to coast—from Dartmouth College to Stanford
University—discordance and mutual suspicion recently
have characterized the nature of relations between whites
and persons of color, men and women, and people of
differing sexual orientations. Those tensions, often
amplified on some highly politicized campuses, reflect the
same social rifts afflicting contemporary American society
as a whole.194
As Siegel explained, “[n]ot since the 1960s have colleges and
universities witnessed this kind of emotionally charged
atmosphere—one that invariably has spawned a resurgence of
heated debate in the campus dailies, political protests, speak-outs,
and sit-ins.”195 Hundreds of public and private colleges and
universities adopted student conduct codes, some of which directly
implicated the right to speak freely.196
It was a time “when the term political correctness first came into
popular use and . . . campus communities, politicians, and the public
at large grappled with issues ranging from campus hate-speech codes
to social taboos regarding race and gender.”197 Civil libertarians
fixated not on specific speech content but on the broader danger of
authorizing the government to restrict speech, a danger judges also

193. CLEARY, supra note 190, at 36–39, 56–59.
194. Evan G.S. Siegel, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression: The Regulation of
Offensive Speech at Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1378–79 (1990).
195. Id. at 1355–56.
196. See Jon Gould, The Triumph of Hate Speech Regulation: Why Gender Wins but
Race Loses in America, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 153, 158 (1999); Steven R. Glaser, Sticks
and Stones May Break My Bones, but Words Can Never Hurt Me: Regulating Speech on
University Campuses, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 265, 267 (1992); Eule & Varat, supra note 33,
at 1590–91; CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 82.
197. Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech, Higher Education, and the PC Narrative, 101 MINN.
L. REV. 1987, 1992 (2017).
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took seriously.198 “It did not take long after the rise of speech codes
on campuses nationwide for plaintiffs to begin successfully
challenging their constitutionality in court.”199 In 1989, the
University of Michigan’s speech code became among the first to be
invalidated.200 The University of Wisconsin’s “Design for Diversity”
was struck down in 1991.201 “Between 1989 and 1995, every court that
examined a university speech code found the code
unconstitutional.”202
Codes at private colleges and universities stood on different
legal footing.203 The code at Brown University resembled the St. Paul
ordinance by authorizing the discipline of students who engaged in
“inappropriate, abusive, threatening or demeaning actions based on
race, religion, gender, handicap, ethnicity, national origin or sexual
orientation.”204 Applying the code in 1991, Brown expelled Douglas
Hann, a varsity football player, for shouting “anti-black, anti-Semitic
and antihomosexual remarks” in a campus courtyard.205 “I think it
is, of course, a case of free speech,” Hann told the New York Times
shortly thereafter.206
To a constitutional lawyer, Hann was wrong because
administrators at Brown University were not state actors and the
Rhode Island courts could not apply the state constitution’s speech
clause to restrain private actors.207 But to Henry Hyde, a Republican
Congressman from Illinois, Hann was right. Hyde saw speech codes

198. See Azhar Majeed, Defying the Constitution: The Rise, Persistence, and Prevalence
of Campus Speech Codes, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 488–93 (2009).
199. Id. at 488.
200. Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Majeed, supra
note 198, at 488–89.
201. UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System, 774 F. Supp. 1163
(E.D. Wis. 1991); Majeed, supra note 198, at 149.
202. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 100–01.
203. Majeed, supra note 198, at 490 (identifying Stanford University’s code as
“the first (and to date only)” code to be judicially invalidated, but under the
“Leonard Law”).
204. Student at Brown Is Expelled Under a Rule Barring “Hate Speech,” N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 12, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/12/us/student-at-brown-isexpelled-under-a-rule-barring-hate-speech.html.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Cf. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982) (explaining that
constitutional protection of free speech applies to government acts, “not to acts of
private persons or entities”).
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“as abhorrent at private institutions as they are at public ones.”208
Hyde denounced Brown and proposed the Collegiate Speech
Protection Act of 1991 to specifically extend the First Amendment’s
speech clause to any “postsecondary educational institution” and to
provide injunctive and declaratory relief as well as recovery of a
prevailing plaintiff’s attorney fees..209
The bill received support “across the political spectrum, from
Barney Frank to Newt Gingrich”210 and from the American Civil
Liberties Union.211 But there was a catch. Hyde’s bill exempted “an
educational institution that is controlled by a religious organization,
to the extent that the application of this section would not be
consistent with the religious tenets of such organization.”212 Hyde’s
bill effectively put sectarian institutions in the “preferred position”
that would apply to an individual like Grace Marsh on the private
streets of Chickasaw.213
In 1992, Bill Leonard, a Republican Senator from California,
proposed state legislation resembling the Collegiate Speech
Protection Act, which like Hyde’s bill, targeted speech codes,
exempted religious institutions, and received broad support,
ranging from the ACLU to College Republicans.214 Unlike Hyde’s
bill, which died in committee, Leonard’s bill “eventually won over
nearly everyone,” passed both state houses almost unanimously, and
was signed into law in September 1992, complete with the exemption
for “a private postsecondary educational institution that is controlled
by a religious organization.”215
208. Henry J. Hyde & George M. Fishman, The Collegiate Speech Protection Act of
1991: A Response to the New Intolerance in the Academy, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1469, 1493
(1991).
209. Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991, H.R. 1380, 102d Cong. (1991);
Janet Bass, Hyde, ACLU Join to Protect Campus Free Speech Rights, UNITED PRESS INT’L
(Mar. 13, 1991), http://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/03/13/Hyde-ACLU-join-toprotect-campus-free-speech-rights/2967668840400.
210. Eule & Varat, supra note 33, at 1594 n.245.
211. Bass, supra note 209 (“Hyde and the American Civil Liberties Union said
they feel the First Amendment should apply to private schools.”); KORS &
SILVERGATE, supra note 175, at 351 (“Hyde . . . joined with the American Civil
Liberties Union . . . to introduce the Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991.”).
212. H.R. 1380, 102d Cong. (1991).
213. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
214. Eule & Varat, supra note 33, at 1591–92, 1594 n.245, 1597.
215. Id. at 1592, 1594 n.245; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367(c) (West 2009). The
California Court of Appeal has affirmed the Leonard Law’s constitutionality on the
grounds that it does not infringe the constitutional right to petition for redress of
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The code at Stanford University, an institution not controlled
by a religious organization, “was the first victim of the Leonard
Law.”216 The code, adopted two years before the law’s enactment,
also resembled St. Paul’s ordinance because it specified instances
when use of racial epithets “would be viewed as harassment by
personal vilification.”217 Civil libertarian and columnist Nat Hentoff
praised the ruling as giving “encouragement to students at private
universities around the country.”218 He predicted that “Stanford’s
defeat is likely to affect private and public colleges in other states.”219
Stanford president Gerhard Casper, a law professor himself and
a former editor of The Supreme Court Review,220 was puzzled by the
California trial court’s ruling. “I thought the First Amendment
freedom of speech and freedom of association is about the pursuit
of ideas,” he stated at the time.221 “Stanford, a private university, had
the idea that its academic goals would be better served if students
never used gutter epithets against fellow students. The California
legislature apparently did not like such ideas, for it prohibited
private secular universities and colleges from establishing their own
standards of civil discourse.”222 Casper was among the few to explain
that nonsectarian private universities were being treated differently
than sectarian ones. “Religious institutions alone can claim First
Amendment protection in this regard,” he stated.223 “The San
Francisco Examiner called my position a ‘laughable convolution,’”
Casper lamented.224 “I guess the Examiner must be right.”225
grievances and “creates statutory free speech rights for students of private
postsecondary educational institutions.” Yu v. Univ. of La Verne, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d
763, 772 (2011).
216. Eule & Varat, supra note 33, at 1595 (explaining the effect of the Leonard
Law on Stanford’s policy on free express and discriminatory harassment).
217. Press Release, Stanford University News Service, Statement on Corry vs.
Stanford University President Gerhard Casper, Stanford University Faculty Senate
(Mar. 9, 1995), http://news.stanford.edu/pr/95/950309Arc5331.html.
218. Nat Hentoff, Chilling Codes, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 1995),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1995/03/25/chilling-codes/
bb194209-31dc-488f-a6df-146cfe7dca06.
219. Id.
220. Gerhard Casper: President Emeritus of Stanford University, STAN. U.,
https://gcasper.stanford.edu (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
221. Stanford University News Service, supra note 217.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.

2018]

PROTECTING SPEECH ON PRIVATE CAMPUSES

659

By the time of Casper’s criticism in the San Francisco press, the
United States Supreme Court had issued its opinion in R.A.V., and it
left Minnesota’s capital city and much of the nation puzzled and
angry.226 All nine Justices agreed St. Paul’s ordinance was facially
unconstitutional, but they differed sharply on why.227 Writing for a
five-member majority, Justice Antonin Scalia explained that by
singling out “specified disfavored topics,” the City Council had
engaged in content-based and viewpoint discrimination that failed
to satisfy strict scrutiny.228 “Let there be no mistake about our belief
that burning a cross in someone’s front yard is reprehensible,” Scalia
wrote. “But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent
such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire.”229
Four Justices, including Harry Blackmun, who grew up with
Chief Justice Burger blocks from where the cross-burning
occurred,230 believed St. Paul’s ordinance was unconstitutionally
overbroad.231 “Although the ordinance as construed reaches
categories of speech that are constitutionally unprotected, it also
criminalizes a substantial amount of expression that—however
repugnant—is shielded by the First Amendment,” Justice Byron
White wrote.232 “The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt
feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression
unprotected.”233
Still, the result was clear. R.A.V. restricted state actors from
enforcing codes that regulated expression based on viewpoint.234
The Minnesota case “created a Catch-22” because public campus
codes that punished “fighting words in general” would be invalidated
as “too broad and vague,” while codes that focused on certain
categories of words covered “too little” speech.235 R.A.V. effectively
invalidated similar campus speech codes at public universities.236
226. CLEARY, supra note 190, at 200–01.
227. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
228. Id. at 391–93.
229. Id. at 396.
230. LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 5–6 (2005).
231. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 413–14 (White, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 413.
233. Id. at 414.
234. Id. at 413–14.
235. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 95.
236. See Eule & Varat, supra note 33, at 1591 n.232; Kitrosser, supra note 197, at
2005–06. See generally KORS & SILVERGATE, supra note 175, at 47 (stating that the
majority of colleges have “verbal behavior” requirements in their codes).
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Consistent with the reality that public and private schools often are
lumped together for free-speech purposes, R.A.V.’s effects were felt
even at private institutions, including Drake University in Des
Moines and Macalester College in St. Paul.237 But legally speaking,
R.A.V. solidified a First Amendment wall between public and private
institutions.238
The internet and proliferation of social media helped
strengthen the legal separation. Even speech occurring off-campus
was at risk and subject to differential treatment.239 For example, after
a Regent University law student was disciplined for posting a
YouTube screen grab of university president Pat Robertson “flipping
the bird,” the student’s First Amendment lawsuit was dismissed in
2009 on a motion for summary judgment.240 In stark contrast, after
a University of Minnesota Mortuary Sciences student was disciplined
for writing Facebook posts about her experience working with a
cadaver, her First Amendment-based claim received a hearing before
the Minnesota Supreme Court in 2012.241
The differential treatment did not deter activists at private
colleges and universities from speaking out—or, as explained in Part
II, from attempting to prevent others from doing so. Activism at
private institutions helped prompt Stanley Kurtz to proclaim 2016–
2017 the “year of the shout-down,” and California legislator Melissa
Melendez to propose the California Campus Free Speech Act.242 The
bill drew comment about the “‘great irony’ that California, the
birthplace of the Free Speech Movement at UC Berkeley in the 1960s

237. See Kitrosser, supra note 197, at 2006, 2010.
238. In 1998, Congress amended the Higher Education Act to articulate the
“sense of Congress” that both public and private institution students’ “participation
in protected speech or protected association” should not affect their participation
in educational programs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1011a(a)(1). The statute contains an
exception for “any constitutionally protected religious liberty, freedom, expression,
or association.” 20 U.S.C. § 1011a(a)(2)(F) (2012). In addition, “it appears clear as
a matter of law that the Higher Education Act does not provide any express or
implied private rights of action for violations of its provisions.” Key v. Robertson,
626 F. Supp. 2d 566, 580 (E.D. Va. 2009) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1011a).
239. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 95; Eule & Varat, supra note
33, at 1591 n.232; Kitrosser, supra note 197, at 2005–06, 2010; KORS & SILVERGATE,
supra note 175, at 47.
240. Key, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
241. See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. 2012).
242. See supra Part II; Kurtz, supra note 45.
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and 1970, is now facing scrutiny over how students can express
themselves on campus.”243
Melendez’s act is the most notable development in campus
speech as this article is being published. The legislation conditioned
funding to colleges and universities, including private ones, on
whether they “develop and adopt a policy on free expression” and
form “a Committee on Free Expression.”244 The bill contained a
familiar exception for schools that claim application of the statute
would be inconsistent with “religious tenets of that organization.”245
Meanwhile, as the 2017–2018 school year began, administrators
at public colleges and universities feared the message of hate at the
University of Virginia would spread to other public campuses and
that a cross-burning case with its origins in the Dayton’s Bluff
neighborhood of St. Paul would prevent state actors from doing
much about it.246
IV. WHY EXTENDING SPEECH LAW WILL NOT WORK: PRACTICAL
BARRIERS

California Republicans are far from alone in seeking lawful ways
to protect speech on private campuses. As explained in Part III, even
Justice Brennan suggested a constitutional solution, albeit a state
constitutional one.247 FIRE and the Student Press Law Center pin
hopes on contract law.248 Meanwhile, the idea lingers that federal
courts might declare private-school administrators to be state
actors.249 This Part explains why it is false hope to expect the law to
protect or regulate speech on private campuses.

243. Melanie Mason, Frustrated with Campus Discourse Limits, California
Republicans Take on “Free Speech Zones,” L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-free-speech-zones-20170524story.html.
244. Cal. Leg. ACA 14, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007), https://leginfo.legislature.
ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180ACA14.
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., Riley Snyder, UNR Can’t Expel or Fire White Nationalist Student
Photographed at Charlottesville Demonstration, NEV. INDEP. (Aug. 15, 2017),
https://thenevadaindependent.com/preview?post_type=article&p=9743&preview
=true&preview_id=9743.
247. See Brennan, supra note 21.
248. See DeWulf, supra note 82.
249. Cf. Eule & Varat, supra note 33, at 1595 (demonstrating how private,
non-religious institutions like Stanford are already vulnerable to scrutiny under the
Leonard Law).
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The State Action Doctrine is Too Settled

From Harvard to St. Olaf to Claremont McKenna College, it is
apparent that “[r]emarkably few, other than lawyers,” care much
about the state action doctrine.250 To be sure, “most academics, and
indeed just about everyone else, share the general intuition that
there is not much of a difference between public and private
universities on a day-to-day basis.”251
The recent publications of the books Free Speech on Campus
reflect and reinforce this reality. Although neither book specifically
advocates for the First Amendment to protect speech on private
campuses, both are infused with the idea that free-speech principles
“should” apply there. As Professor Ben-Porath wrote: “It is easy to
agree that the First Amendment provides historic, legal, and political
contexts that should be respected and protected.”252 As Professors
Chemerinsky and Gillman put it: “Although the First Amendment
applies only to public universities, all colleges and universities should
commit themselves to these values.”253
As early as 1989, Chemerinsky was articulating that public and
private schools both “perform an essential public function” and
therefore “should be obligated to follow the United States
Constitution.”254 He suggested the remedy was “to declare that
private schools perform an essential public function and must
comply with the Constitution.”255 He voiced similar views in a 1998
essay, More Speech Is Better, explaining “government-imposed
orthodoxy on private institutions often is a good thing,” as with laws
prohibiting race and gender discrimination.256
Brian Steffen, a communications professor at Simpson College
in Indianola, Iowa, provided a similar view from an educator’s
perspective, observing that it is “difficult to argue private higher
education does not fulfill a public function in American society.”257
250. Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 1638.
251. Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers
and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1525 (2007).
252. BEN-PORATH, supra note 34, at 69.
253. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 20.
254. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Private Schools, in PUBLIC VALUES,
PRIVATE SCHOOLS 275 (Neil L. Devins, ed., 1989).
255. Id. at 286.
256. Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 1637.
257. Brian J. Steffen, Freedom of the Private-University Student Press: A Constitutional
Proposal, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 139, 157 (2002).
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Steffen advocated for “qualified First Amendment protection for
student journalists” at private schools258 and argued that, from a
student’s perspective, “there are legitimate public policy reasons,
including natural justice and fair play, for making constitutional
standards obligatory on private colleges and universities.”259
Students at private schools are more likely to receive federal aid than
their public-school counterparts,260 so it is not far-fetched to expect
federal law to regulate speech.
But asking a federal court to “declare” that they can regulate
speech on private campuses is difficult. A declaration must be
supported by precedent, so arguing what the law “should” be will not
survive Rule 12, let alone Rule 11.261 The settled precedent is
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, a case in which teachers unsuccessfully asserted
First Amendment claims against their private school, which received
up to 99% of its revenue from the state to educate struggling
students who could not attend public schools.262 The Supreme Court
did not follow the money in that specific case. Instead, it fixated on
the nature of education in general, holding that education was not
the “exclusive prerogative of the State.”263 There is no sign the
Supreme Court would feel differently about private postsecondary
institutions as a group.
Maybe in a specific circumstance an argument could be made
that a private college or university administrator is a state actor. As
explained in Part III, during the Vietnam War, the Eighth Circuit
stood ready “to protect constitutionally guaranteed activities or
conduct from interference by either the State or private
individuals,”264 and the Second Circuit held that administrators at a
private university were state actors when they acted on behalf of a

258. Id. at 142.
259. Siegel, supra note 194, at 1387.
260. See Cory A. DeCresenza, Rethinking the Effect of Public Funding on the
State-Actor Status of Private Schools in First Amendment Freedom of Speech Actions, 59
SYRACUSE L. REV. 471, 474, 482 (2009).
261. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (explaining dismissal for failure to state a
claim); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) (explaining that by filing a document, a lawyer
certifies, “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law”).
262. 457 U.S. 830, 832 (1982).
263. Id. at 842 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
264. United States v. Mechanic, 454 F.2d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 1971).
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college founded by the state of New York.265 Today, a plaintiff who
alleges private university security guards are state actors on grounds
that they also are “sworn police officers” might overcome Rule 12.266
A public university cannot contract away its free-speech obligations
by hosting a controversial event on a private campus any more than
a city can exclude all expressive activity at a city park by leasing it to
a private actor.267 Thus, even today, the line between public and
private can be fuzzy.
In addition, Marsh v. Alabama remains good law268 and provides
some support for extending federal speech law to private
campuses.269 “Marsh and the shopping-center cases clearly establish
that some private properties fulfill public functions amenable to
constitutional protection,”270 and arguably, private campuses are
among them.271 There also is room to argue that Marsh has exceeded
its bounds and is infringing the rights of individual students who
would like to speak out on their sectarian campuses—or just on
Facebook—but risk expulsion if they do so.272
Chemerinsky saw federal regulation of private campus speech
coming. He warned nearly three decades ago: “Although the state
action doctrine may be desirable in preserving a zone of individual
freedom exempt from government control, there is no reason why
an institution, such as a private school, should have such
immunity.”273 Immunity is effectively what sectarian institutions
receive by and through the Title IX exemptions that permit them to
maintain and enforce codes that regulate expression on GLBT issues
and viewpoints. At private institutions, the Department of Education

265. Powe v. Mills, 407 F.2d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1968).
266. Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., No. 4:11-cv-1679, 2012 WL 1569826, at *3–4
(M.D. Pa. May 3, 2012) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss claims).
267. Gay-Lesbian-Bisexual-Transgender Pride/Twin Cities v. Minneapolis Park
& Rec. Bd., 721 F. Supp. 2d 866, 873 (D. Minn. 2010).
268. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Although Marsh has not been cited
in a United States Supreme Court majority opinion since 1991, it has not been
overruled. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 640 (1991).
269. Marsh, 326 U.S. 501 at 278–79.
270. Steffen, supra note 257, at 157.
271. See Alysa Freeman, Go to the Mall with My Parents?: A Constitutional Analysis
of the Mall of America’s Juvenile Curfew, 102 DICK. L. REV. 481, 488–89, 503–04
(describing how Marsh and other mall speech cases have both complemented and
been informed by various private campus speech cases).
272. Sarabyn, supra note 5, at 147.
273. Chemerinsky, supra note 254, at 281.
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has facilitated the sort of viewpoint discrimination that R.A.V. forbids
at public institutions, casting serious doubt on the viability of any
branch of the government—regardless of ideology or party
control—to regulate speech on private campuses.274
The role of for-profit online educators introduces a new twist,
one that commentators have not had opportunity to examine. The
recent events in Charlottesville demonstrate that sometimes, albeit
perhaps rarely, private entities—even for-profit ones—play
meaningful roles in the marketplace of ideas and association. For
example, before Charlottesville, “the lodging rental company
Airbnb quietly booted users who it believed were searching for
lodging to attend the rally.”275 Afterward, GoDaddy and Google
refused to play host to the white supremacist website The Daily
Stormer.276 Turning for-profit educators into state actors could strip
those institutions and their nonsectarian nonprofit cousins of means
to tame hate in ways the government cannot.
B.

Using State Constitutional or Contract Law Is Practically Impossible

Apart from the state action doctrine is the idea that state law can
and should regulate campus speech in ways federal judges cannot.
Indeed, “state courts are free to use a more inclusive conception to
enforce their state constitutional guarantees.”277 Justice Brennan
voiced the same view in his 1977 Harvard Law Review article.278 But
to date, only the Pennsylvania and New Jersey supreme courts have
used state constitutions to protect speech on private campuses and
only in the narrow context of political events held open to the
274. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); see also Schumacher v.
Argosy Educ. Group, Inc., Civ. No. 05-531, 2006 WL 3511795 (D. Minn. Dec. 6,
2006) (denying relief to a student expelled from the university for expressing that
a student lounge should have less GLBT materials).
275. Kyle Swenson, Airbnb Boots White Nationalists Headed to “Unite the Right” Rally
in Charlottesville, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/new
s/morning-mix/wp/2017/08/08/airbnb-boots-white-nationalists-headed-to-unitethe-right-rally-in-charlottesville.
276. Katie Mettler & Avi Selk, GoDaddy—Then Google—Ban Neo-Nazi Site Daily
Stormer for Disparaging Charlottesville Victim, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/08/14/godaddybans-neo-nazi-site-daily-stormer-for-disparaging-woman-killed-at-charlottesvillerally.
277. Comment, Private Abridgment of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J.
165, 183 (1980).
278. Brennan, supra note 21, at 502–03.
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public.279 Subsequently, the Pennsylvania court held the state
constitution did not prevent a private shopping mall from excluding
all political speech,280 and it is hard to see how the same rule would
not apply at private colleges and universities. The rest of the states
simply have not taken Justice Brennan’s advice to use state
constitutions to protect speech on college campuses.
Efforts to mix constitutional law with the common law offer little
help. Abbariao v. Hamline School of Law, in which the Minnesota
Supreme Court created a cause of action for a student who alleged
his expulsion was “arbitrary” or “capricious,” remains good law but
has been applied narrowly.281 For example, in Schumacher v. Argosy
Education Group, Inc., a federal court rejected an Abbariao-based claim
of an evangelical Christian who was expelled from his doctor of
psychology program after expressing views that a student lounge
should have fewer GLBT materials.282 The student was expelled for
failure to show “social awareness and social sensitivity,” which the
court held was a permissible academic reason to prevent relief under
Abbariao.283
The student also pleaded breach of contract, which the court
dismissed under Minnesota’s educational malpractice bar.284 The
bar is practically insurmountable when a speech claim is based on
contract law, particularly at sectarian colleges and universities where
campus codes are entangled with religious doctrine.285 As a federal
court explained when dismissing a claim alleging a college for
Christian Scientists failed to honor various promises:
Were the Court to wade into the issue of how closely
Principia College operated within the constructs of the

279. See Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1981); State v. Schmid, 423
A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980).
280. W. Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515
A.2d 1331, 1333 (Pa. 1986).
281. Abbariao v. Hamline Univ. Sch. of Law, 258 N.W.2d 108, 113 (Minn. 1977);
see also Doe v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 240 F. Supp. 3d 984, 993 (D. Minn. 2017) (citing
Abbariao, 258 N.W.2d at 112).
282. Civ. No. 05-531, 2006 WL 3511795 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2006).
283. Id. at *12.
284. Id. at *13 (“Accordingly, the Court finds that the alleged specific promises
in the Handbook did not create a contract, and Schumacher’s claim therefore fails
as a matter of law. Thus, the Court dismisses Schumacher’s breach of contract
claim.”).
285. See, e.g., Gillis v. Principia Corp., 111 F. Supp. 3d 978, 983–86 (E.D. Mo.
2015).
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plethora of vague, general, and aspirational ‘mission
statement-esque’ provisions cited by Plaintiff, the Court
would be forced to engage—with complete disregard for
Missouri law—in an educational malpractice analysis rife
with the practical and policy concerns.286
Several more practical barriers exist. Because contracts must be
read as a whole,287 a court may not give priority to a speech-friendly
provision while blue-penciling out speech-restrictive ones.288
Contract damages are generally monetary.289 A student expelled for
saying something controversial “would likely suffer economic harm
arising from lost tuition, room and board, employment offers, and
graduate school admissions.”290 But, “likely” is not good enough to
withstand summary judgment. Damage claims premised on such
“unsupported speculation” will be excluded from evidence.291
Moreover, requesting non-monetary remedies such as an injunction
or an order for specific performance risks asking a court to compel
or restrict speech in ways that violate the First Amendment.292
Finally, the proliferation of online and for-profit universities
makes it practically impossible to use state constitutional law or
common law to litigate contract-based speech claims. Students who
study online come from many jurisdictions, and although
forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses might be enforceable, so

286. Id. at 985.
287. See, e.g., Flores v. Am. Seafoods Co., 335 F.3d 904, 910 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A]
written contract must be read as a whole and every part interpreted with reference
to the whole, with preference given to reasonable interpretations.” (quoting
Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir.
1999))).
288. See generally Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791, 794–95 (Minn. 1977)
(defining and criticizing the “blue pencil” doctrine).
289. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346 (1981).
290. Sarabyn, supra note 5, at 166 (emphasis added).
291. Andler v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 670 F.3d 717, 727 (6th Cir. 2012)
(“Departures from actual pre-injury earnings must be justified and cannot be
unduly speculative.”).
292. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (discussing how compelled
speech “invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control” (quoting W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943))); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697, 714 (1931) (“[T]he main purpose of such constitutional provisions is ‘to
prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by
other governments.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313–14
(Mass. 1825))).
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might mandatory arbitration clauses.293 Because for-profit
corporations might claim reputational interests and fiduciary
obligations that surpass those of nonprofit corporations, for-profit
universities might choose aggressive responses to student lawsuits,
just as Trump University did when asserting a defamation
counterclaim in a student’s case alleging deceptive trade practices.294
Of course, for-profit and online schools have speech codes
too,295 but they have not drawn the ire of advocates at FIRE or much
attention from scholars. In her book, Free Speech on Campus,
Ben-Porath acknowledged that “online communication presents a
growing set of challenges,” but she focused on social media and took
the position that “online speech should be seen as separate from
campus speech.”296 The problem with Ben-Porath’s approach is that
“campuses” are only virtual at online schools, so online speech is the
primary—if not exclusive—means of classroom instruction and
discussion. Capella’s policies not only invite online expression on
sensitive topics; they promote it. As a webpage titled “Diversity Makes
a Difference at Capella” explains: “Students in a Capella business
course may be asked to consider how Ramadan would affect sales of
a product. Learners on a counseling track might be urged to think
about how their future clients’ ethnic backgrounds or sexual
orientation might inform their worldview.”297 Using contract law to
adjudicate speech claims arising from online class participation on

293. See, e.g., Rosendahl v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., No. 11-cv-61, 2012 WL
667049 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2012) (enforcing the arbitration clause of an executed
enrollment agreement).
294. Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254 (9th Cir. 2013).
295. Cf. University Policies & Consumer Information, CAPELLA UNIV.,
https://www.capella.edu/content/dam/capella/PDF/policies/4.02.02.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 20, 2018) (forbidding “disrespect,” which is defined to include
“harassing, threatening, or embarrassing others,” posting “racially, religiously, or
ethnically offensive” material, and “disruptive conduct” that includes “threatening
or belligerent language,” “lewd or indecent language or behavior,” and “inciting
others to engage in disruptive conduct”); Student Handbook, WALDEN UNIV.,
http://catalog.waldenu.edu/content.php?catoid=41&navoid=5129 (last visited
Mar. 20, 2018) (forbidding sexual harassment and unwelcomed “conduct or
communication” directed toward another person that relates to “race, color,
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, religion, age, mental or physical
disability, veteran status, marital status, or other protected characteristics”).
296. BEN-PORATH, supra note 34, at 78.
297. Diversity Makes a Difference, CAPELLA UNIV. (Feb. 2, 2016),
https://www.capella.edu/blogs/cublog/a-look-at-diversity-at-capella-university/.
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culturally-sensitive topics runs head-on into the educational
malpractice bar.
Contract claims may be subject to internal university policies
that disciplinary decisions are “final” and not subject to a court’s
review.298 In 2016, the Third Circuit held that Capella’s finality policy
“precludes appellate-like review of the merits of Capella’s
disciplinary decision.”299 A federal court in the District of Oregon
made a similar ruling with respect to Walden’s internal appellate
procedures.300 The bottom line is that private colleges and
universities stand in a starkly different position than public ones, and
state law offers little practical help for those who advocate for
speech-related legal protections on private campuses.
C.

Statutes Are Swallowed by the Sectarian Exception

And then there are statutes that apply to private schools. At the
time of this writing, only one such statute exists—California’s
Leonard Law, enacted in 1992.301 As explained in Parts II and III,
another California statute has been proposed.302 In his 1998 essay
More Speech is Better, Chemerinsky voiced general support for
speech-protective statutes to apply on private campuses.303 However,
his most recent book, Free Speech on Campus, skirted the statutory
issue.304
Perhaps Chemerinsky ignored the speech-protective statute
issue in his recent work because since 1998, the internet has
revolutionized higher education in ways that make it highly doubtful
that state statutes can meaningfully and fairly protect speech on
298. See, e.g., Reardon v. Allegheny Coll., 926 A.2d 477, 482–83, 482 n.5 (noting
the parties’ agreement that “[t]he decision of the President is final” is adequate to
insulate “‘private, internal decisions’ of the College” from external review).
299. See Mekuns v. Capella Educ. Co., 655 F. App’x 149, 150 (3d Cir. 2016)
(addressing student dismissal for breach of University Policy 3.03.06, research
misconduct).
300. Gibson v. Walden Univ. LLC, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1325–26 (D. Or. 2014)
(noting the Walden Student Handbook “expressly declaims the formation of a
contract”).
301. CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 94367 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 859 of 2017
Reg. Sess.).
302. See ACA 14, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017), https://leginfo.legislature.c
a.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180ACA14; see supra notes 57, 244–
45 and accompanying text.
303. Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 1643–44.
304. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18.
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private campuses. Would California’s Leonard Law or the proposed
California Campus Free Speech Act305 apply when a student who is
not from the state studies online at a California university? Does the
Leonard Law apply when a California resident studies outside the
state? Regardless of how such questions are answered, students in
different states could end up being treated unequally.
A bigger problem of unequal treatment stems from the
sectarian-school exceptions in the Leonard Law and the proposed
California Campus Free Speech Act, exceptions that unquestionably
would appear in any federal statute resembling Henry Hyde’s
Collegiate Speech Protection Act.306 The exceptions enable actors at
some private colleges and universities—but only the sectarian
ones—to engage in exactly the sort of viewpoint discrimination
R.A.V. forbids at public schools.307
Some proponents for extending speech regulations to private
campuses pay little, if any, attention to this unequal treatment. In
The Shadow University, Kors and Silvergate lambasted nonsectarian
universities but said little about sectarian schools other than citing
their right “to enforce speech restrictions with bona fide religious
purposes.”308 In 2010, a former fellow at FIRE described sectarian
schools as “ideological universities” and likened them to “military
academies” where “students’ reasonable expectations would be that
they would have a more limited right to free speech at such an
institution.”309
Another group that advocates for students’ rights, the Student
Press Law Center, attempted to put a positive spin on the unequal
treatment by providing context that sectarian schools provide “each
American an amazing diversity of choice to fit their unique interests
and passions.”310 A page on the ACLU website titled “Speech on
Campus” ignores the speech that occurs on private campuses—even
nonsectarian ones—altogether,311 while another page on the website

305. See ACA 14, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
306. See Collegiate Speech Protection Act of 1991, H.R. 1380, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (Cal. 1991).
307. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (addressing bias-motivated
expression).
308. KORS & SILVERGATE, supra note 175, at 352.
309. Sarabyn, supra note 5, at 178–81.
310. DeWulf, supra note 31.
311. Speech on Campus, ACLU.ORG, https://www.aclu.org/other/speech-campus
(last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
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titled “ACLU Defense of Religious Practice and Expression” explains
the organization “vigorously defends the rights of all Americans to
practice their religion.”312 Although the ACLU appears not to
advocate for individuals’ rights to speak freely at sectarian colleges
and universities, it defends the rights of individuals to proselytize at
public ones.313
The authors of the two books, both entitled Free Speech on
Campus, analyzed colleges and universities broadly in a way that
provided an incomplete picture of private education and therefore
speech on private campuses. Ben-Porath’s suggestion in her book
that “there is no need to accommodate religious or ideological
objections to accepted knowledge”314 ignores that the government
recognizes not only a need, but a right to such accommodations at
sectarian institutions. Chemerinsky and Gillman broadly declare in
their book that “censoring ideas” is “never permissible” and
“campuses must be open to all ideas and views,”315 but they do not
confront the fact that a sizable portion of private sectarian campuses
are not so open. Chemerinsky and Gillman did consider a
sectarian-related dilemma, but only in the context of whether a
university (presumably a public one) could punish Christian
students for expressing the belief that “traditional heterosexual
marriage is the only true marriage.”316
Assuming a Christian student is against gay marriage ignores
that plenty of Christian students are for gay marriage,317 would like
to say so (even at sectarian institutions), and would like to align
themselves with the growing majority of Americans who support gay
marriage.318 Ignoring those students and their schools, as virtually

312. ACLU Defense of Religious Practice and Expression, ACLU.ORG,
https://www.aclu.org/aclu-defense-religious-practice-and-expression (last visited
Mar. 20, 2018).
313. ACLU Tells Virginia Community College System that Campus Demonstration
Policies
are
Unconstitutional,
ACLUVIRGINIA.ORG
(Mar.
24,
2014),
https://acluva.org/14911/aclu-tells-virginia-community-college-system-that-campu
s-demonstration-policies-are-unconstitutional.
314. BEN-PORATH, supra note 34, at xx.
315. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 15, 83, 122–23, 132.
316. Id. at 105.
317. See Christians for Gay Rights, BROAD BLOGS (Sept. 9, 2011),
https://broadblogs.com/2011/09/09/christians-for-gay-rights/
(“[S]ome
Christian students were for gay marriage because they had learned how it would
help families.”).
318. Justin McCarthy, U.S. Support for Gay Marriage Edges to New High, GALLUP
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every analysis of campus speech has done,319 is a grave mistake given
the increased growth and influence of sectarian institutions in the
last few decades. Between 1980 and 2011, enrollment at “religiously
affiliated” institutions grew 86%, compared with 60% at public
institutions and 35% at “independent nonprofit” private
institutions.320 “The religious identity of many private colleges and
universities paled over the twentieth century, but in some settings,
especially Catholic ones, the institutions’ religious identity gained
renewed vigor.”321
Meanwhile, sectarian institutions have sought and gained
approval for speech-restrictive Title IX exemptions, with little
scrutiny and apparently no litigation.322 If a federal speech bill
becomes law, it would contain a sectarian exception, and it is false
hope to expect courts to interpret and apply such an exception by
analyzing the strength of schools’ sectarian connections. Courts have
struggled with that sort of line-drawing for decades, particularly in
Minnesota. In a 1982 decision, Larson v. Valente, the United States
Supreme Court invalidated a Minnesota statute that required
financial disclosures for churches that solicited more than half their
funds from nonmembers.323 The Supreme Court held that the
Minnesota law violated the “clearest command of the Establishment

NEWS (May 15, 2017), http://www.gallup.com/poll/210566/support-gay-marriageedges-new-high.aspx (stating that sixty-four percent of Americans believe same-sex
marriage should be legal).
319. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, College Students Oppose Restrictions on Political Speech,
GALLUP NEWS (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/190451/collegestudents-oppose-restrictions-political-speech.aspx; Lydia Saad & Jeffrey M. Jones,
More College Students than U.S. Adults Say Free Speech is Secure, GALLUP NEWS (Apr. 4,
2016),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/190442/college-students-adults-say-freespeech-secure.aspx.
320. See Digest of Education Statistics, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d12/tables/dt12_231.asp (last visited Mar.
20, 2018).
321. Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and
Private, Non-profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1072
(2000).
322. Scott Jaschik, Education Dept. Releases Title IX Exemptions, Requests, INSIDE
HIGHER
EDUC.
(May
2,
2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/
quicktakes/2016/05/02/education-dept-releases-title-ix-exemptions-requests; see
also supra Part II.B.
323. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982).
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Clause,” which is “that one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another.”324
Eight years later, the “command” arose again in Minnesota
when a federal district court confronted whether the state violated
the Establishment Clause by paying for eleventh- and twelfth-graders
to attend eight private colleges and universities with varying
sectarian ties.325 To determine the strength of each school’s sectarian
connections, the court identified nine “difficult to follow” Supreme
Court cases and pieced together a thirty-six-part test for determining
whether a college or university is “pervasively sectarian.”326 The
resulting published decision, Minnesota Federation of Teachers v.
Nelson, was not broadly cited and was described by the General
Counsel to the National Conference of Catholic Bishops as
“cumbersome.”327
In 1998, the sectarian exemption question surfaced again in
Columbia Union College v. Clarke, when the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals confronted whether a college affiliated with the Seventh Day
Adventist Church was “pervasively sectarian.”328 The United States
Supreme Court denied review, which drew a dissent from Justice
Clarence Thomas, who urged the court to “scrap” its “pervasively
sectarian” Agostini test.329
A year later, Justice Thomas wrote for a four-member plurality
that all but rejected the Agostini test in the context of state funding
for a sectarian elementary and secondary school.330 That case,
Mitchell v. Helms, was argued in the Supreme Court by Michael W.
McConnell, then a professor at the University of Utah College of

324. Id. at 255; see id. at 244.
325. See Minn. Fed’n of Teachers v. Nelson, 740 F. Supp. 694, 696 (D. Minn.
1990).
326. Id. at 709, 714 n.3, 718 (noting tests that include whether some classes
begin with prayer and whether mandatory theology or religion courses “are taught
with a taint of religious indoctrination”).
327. Mark E. Chopko, Religious Access to Public Programs and Governmental
Funding, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645, 667 n.101 (1992).
328. Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151, 162–63 (4th Cir. 1998).
329. Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 527 U.S. 1013, 1013 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 159 F.3d at 157–58 (reaffirming the
“Agostini directive,” which combined the “‘effect’ and ‘entanglement’ prongs” of the
Lemon test into a “single ‘effect’ inquiry”); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997).
330. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808, 826–27 (2000) (“In this case, the
inquiry under Agostini’s purpose and effect test is a narrow one.”).
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Law, who was appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals two
years later.331 In Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, Judge
McConnell delivered a significant blow to the “pervasively sectarian”
test, writing that the state of Colorado violated the Establishment
Clause when it denied scholarships to students on grounds that the
school they attended was “pervasively sectarian.”332 Judge
McConnell’s case law authority in Colorado Christian included
Columbia Union College, Larson, and the Mitchell case he argued in the
United States Supreme Court.333 “The Colorado law seems even
more problematic than the Minnesota law invalidated in Larson,” he
wrote.334 “The Minnesota law at least was framed in terms of secular
considerations: how much money was raised internally and how
much from outsiders to the institution.”335
In affirming the flow of state money to Colorado Christian
University, the Tenth Circuit panel was untroubled by the school’s
“Lifestyle Covenant Agreement,” which required students to follow
“the example of Jesus Christ and the teachings of the Bible.”336 The
court described the agreement as regulating “conduct, not belief.”337
However, in her 2017 article, Hubertz singled out Colorado
Christian University’s code as speech-restrictive because it forbade
“defending or advocating a homosexual lifestyle.”338
Commentary on Colorado Christian was mixed.339 What does
seem clear is that the United States Supreme Court appears on the
verge of holding that any sectarian connection is enough to exempt
private schools from a host of federal laws, and a speech statute
would be among them. The schools would receive an additional

331. See id. at 800; Michael W. McConnell, STAN. L. SCH., https://wwwcdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/McConnell-Michael-CV-7.5.1
6.pdf.
332. 534 F.3d 1245, 1253 (10th Cir. 2008).
333. See id. at 1258–59.
334. Id. at 1259.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 1252.
337. Id.
338. Hubertz, supra note 58, at 187–88.
339. Compare Richard F. Duncan, The “Clearest Command” of the Establishment
Clause: Denominational Preferences, Religious Liberty, and Public Scholarships that Classify
Religions, 55 S.D. L. REV. 390, 410 (2010) (supporting the Colorado Christian University
holding), with Recent Case, Tenth Circuit Strikes Down Colorado Law Exempting
“Pervasively Sectarian” Religious Colleges from State Scholarship Program, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1255, 1262 (2009) (criticizing the Colorado Christian University holding).
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shield from the proposed “First Amendment Defense Act,” which
was a direct response to Obergefell v. Hodges,340 in which the United
States Supreme Court affirmed a fundamental right for same-sex
couples to marry.341 As Hubertz explains, “Evangelical colleges are
fighting hard against the implications of Obergefell.”342 Potentially,
under Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,343 even a for-profit university,
online or otherwise, could try to claim an exemption from a speech
statute since the corporation Hobby Lobby could claim a sectarian
connection.344
At this time, corporations remain a wildcard. As Airbnb,
GoDaddy, and Google demonstrated before and after the
Charlottesville tragedy, sometimes corporations can and will take
stands the government cannot take, not only against white
supremacy, 345 but in favor of GLBT rights. “Corporate America’s
evolution on gay rights appears to have reached a tipping point, one
where so many companies have taken a stand on the issue that the
risk of speaking out has been superseded by the risk of not doing
so.”346
V. WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN: EDUCATION, NOT LAWS
This article has considered whether the law can or should
protect speech on private college and university campuses, as it does

340. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
341. Jonathan Rauch, Gay Rights, Religious Liberty, and Nondiscrimination: Can a
Train Wreck Be Avoided?, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1195, 1195, 1195 n.2 (2017) (citing H.R.
2802, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 1598, 114th Cong. (2015)); see also Obergefell, 135 S.
Ct. at 2607–08.
342. Hubertz, supra note 58, at 168.
343. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
344. Id. (affirming for-profit employer’s exemption from providing health
insurance for procedures and medications the employer found religiously
objectionable). “Hobby Lobby is a sweeping decision that threatens to turn [the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993] into a law that—instead of protecting
religious freedom—allows religious believers to force their faiths on others in a
variety of ways.” Alex J. Luchenitser, Symposium, Religious Accommodation in the Age
of Civil Rights: A New Era of Inequality? Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions from
Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 63 (2015).
345. See Swenson, supra note 275; Mettler & Selk; supra note 276.
346. Jena McGregor, Corporate America’s Embrace of Gay Rights Has Reached a
Stunning Tipping Point, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2016/04/05/corporate-americas-e
mbrace-of-gay-rights-has-reached-a-stunning-tipping-point.
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on public campuses. On the question of whether it can do so, the
article has explained that the practical barriers are significant.
Federal judges will not alter the state action doctrine cavalierly,
contract law is a bad fit for enforcing speech-protective provisions in
campus codes, and state statutes are unworkable in an era of online
and for-profit education.
Regarding whether the law should do so, it is a confusing issue
that has come at a most confusing and contentious time. There
clearly is an appetite and a market for considering the question,
evidenced by two books titled Free Speech on Campus being published
as the 2017–2018 school year began.347 Unfortunately, the books do
not help answer the question because they provide a perspective that
all universities are the same348 when, legally, they most certainly are
not.
The authors of Free Speech on Campus did not have the
opportunity to consider the speech at the University of Virginia,
which for much of the nation was a game-changer349 in the way that
R.A.V.’s cross-burning was for much of St. Paul.350 Under the current
law, the public university was relatively powerless when the white
supremacists brought their torches. A private university, by contrast,
has more legal tools to snuff out hate. Private corporations have
earned credibility too, for now at least.351 If there ever was a time to
advocate for the law to regulate speech on private campuses, this is
not it.
But this is a good time for reflection across the political
spectrum. Progressives would benefit from listening to civil
libertarians, who wisely caution against trusting those in power.
Progressives would also benefit from acknowledging that sometimes
corporations, even for-profit educators, can play positive roles in
diversity and speech. Meanwhile, civil libertarians and others who
advocate for students’ individual rights risk losing credibility by not
confronting the government-endorsed viewpoint discrimination that
is occurring under Title IX, to the detriment of individual students.

347. See BEN-PORATH, supra note 34; CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18.
348. See BEN-PORATH, supra note 34, at 8; CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note
18, at 113.
349. Cf. Stolberg & Rosenthal, supra note 11.
350. See Cleary, supra note 10.
351. See, e.g., McGregor, supra note 346 (describing how a swelling tide of
corporations have, with public credibility, set the tone for GLBT rights advocacy).
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As for social conservatives, they have valid points about the value
of minority views and the danger of excluding them. But they, too,
ignore that minority views are excluded from some sectarian colleges
and universities. Too many social conservatives did too little to
prevent the harassment of speakers such as Princeton’s
Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, who faced threats of being “lynched, shot
and raped” after Fox News aired thirty seconds of a commencement
address in which she criticized, of all people, the President of the
United States.352 As she wrote in the New York Times: “When it comes
to protecting the speech of people who are most vulnerable to being
intimidated into silence—like people of color and gay people—
conservatives either are suspiciously quiet or drive further
intimidation with wildly negative news coverage.”353
As for students and student activists in particular, they need to
learn the basic lesson that shouting down controversial speakers and
defacing a Muslim students’ bridge mural with “ISIS” are not speech.
They are acts—sometimes criminal ones. On this issue, Chemerinsky
and Gillman were spot-on: “There is, of course, no First Amendment
right to destroy someone else’s property, even if it is done to
communicate a message.”354 “There is no First Amendment right to
disrupt classes or other campus activities.”355 Plainly, more education
about freedom of speech is needed, and not only in law schools or
even colleges. As the authors explain, today’s traditional-age
students constitute “the first generation of students educated, from
a young age, not to bully,” but they know “little about the history of
free speech in the United States” and lack “awareness of how
important free speech had been to vulnerable political
minorities.”356
The efforts to increase awareness should focus not only on the
First Amendment, but also on the Fourteenth Amendment. By its
plain language, the First Amendment limits only “Congress,”357 and
the principles underlying its Speech Clause extend to state and local
actors only because the United States Supreme Court decided free
speech is embodied by the Fourteenth Amendment’s assurance of

352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

Taylor, supra note 52.
Id.
CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 18, at 123.
Id.
Id. at 10.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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liberty.358 Freedom from speech restrictions is a cherished liberty
interest, but so is being free from homophobia, sex and gender
discrimination, and racial hate. If the pictures from Charlottesville
taught us anything, it is that untold numbers of Americans—
including apparently white college-aged ones in the racial majority—
do not have the foggiest idea what the Fourteenth Amendment
stands for.
After Charlottesville, the question of whether the law can or
should protect or regulate speech on private colleges and
universities became even more difficult. At this writing, the answer is
one that free-speech advocates probably do not want to hear. As
Simpson College Professor Brian Steffen put it: “A private university,
in many respects, more accurately resembles a benevolent
dictatorship than it does a democratic community.”359 When the
speakers come to campus bearing torches, the dictatorship can be as
much a blessing as a curse.

358.
359.

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
Steffen, supra note 257, at 172.
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